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Sammendrag 
Vi analyserer hvordan ulike utforminger av et system med karbontoll kan øke effektiviteten til 
klimapolitikken til en gruppe av land (koalisjon). I vårt eksempel ser vi på et kvotesystem for CO2 i 
EU, mens resten av verden ikke fører noen aktiv klimapolitikk. Dersom EU kombinerer CO2-
(kvote)prising med å legge toll på importerte varer som inneholder karbon, vil det føre til mindre 
karbonlekkasje og dermed ha en større klimaeffekt.  
 
I prinsippet skal tollsatsene utformes slik at karboninnholdet i hver enkelt importerte vare beskattes 
med samme sats som CO2-prisen i koalisjonen, og karboninnholdet som medregnes skal inkludere alle 
direkte og indirekte utslippseffekter produksjonen av importvaren har forårsaket utenfor koalisjonen. I 
praksis er det imidlertid mange administrative, politiske og legale hindringer i veien for å få på plass et 
slikt optimalt system for karbontoll.  
 
Vi ser derfor på ulike praktiske utforminger av et system for karbontoll. Først utleder vi analytiske 
resultater i en partiell modell for to regioner – koalisjonen og resten av verden. Deretter kvantifiserer 
vi, ved hjelp av en numerisk global likevektsmodell (SNoW), hvordan tollsystemene påvirker 
karbonlekkasje, velferd og fordeling mellom koalisjonen og landene utenfor.  
 
Vi finner at karbontoll som rettes direkte mot karbonutslippene til den enkelte bedrift utenfor 
koalisjonen reduserer karbonlekkasjen og øker den økonomiske effektiviteten sammenliknet med 
karbontollsatser som er utformet i forhold til gjennomsnittlig karbonutslipp i en næring. Karbontoll er 
en implisitt CO2-pris. I et system hvor tollsatsen er beregnet ut fra karbonutslippene i den enkelte 
bedrift, vil den enkelte produsent kunne tilpasse sin produksjon til den implisitte CO2-prisen. Dersom 
tollsystemet også rettes mot indirekte utslipp knyttet til elektrisitetsforbruket i bedriftene utenfor 
koalisjonen, vil insentivene til å kutte utslipp bli enda sterkere. Dermed faller kostnadene for 
produsentene og økonomiene utenfor koalisjonen. I tillegg til at målrettede karbontollsatser gjør 
reduksjoner i de globale utslippene billigere, vil det kunne bidra til å redusere de politiske og legale 
problemene knyttet til å innføre karbontoll. 
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1. Introduction 
The climate effect of unilateral carbon pricing is undermined if emission-intensive production is 
relocated to less regulated jurisdictions, so-called carbon leakage. Seminal theoretical papers by 
Markusen (1975) and Hoel (1996) suggest that a region should supplement its unilateral carbon 
pricing with border carbon adjustments (BCAs). BCAs are tariffs designed so as to tax, equally to 
domestic emissions, the carbon emissions directly and indirectly embodied in imports (carbon tariffs), 
combined with rebates of emission payments for exports from the unilaterally regulating region. 
Markusen (1975) and Hoel (1996) show that the most cost-effective BCA system for reducing carbon 
leakage is one that incentivises foreign producers to abate until their marginal abatement costs equal 
the carbon price of the unilaterally regulating region.  
 
Although carbon tariffs have not been implemented so far, they are assessed and debated in several 
OECD countries. In the US and Australia the discussions have been closely linked to proposed cap-
and-trade systems.1 The EU, that already has a cap-and-trade system, has been nearest to a system 
taxing imports by its attempt in 2012 to incorporate into the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) all 
flights to and from EU airports (Directive 2008/101/EC). The plan has been put on hold due to fierce 
opposition from the international aviation community and major non-EU countries such as the US and 
China (Ireland, 2012). The ongoing political debate on measures for pricing emission from aviation at 
a global scale highlights the importance of distributional and legal issues at stake. 
 
Various empirical studies have quantified the implications of carbon tariffs with alternative designs on 
the coverage of embodied carbon and the range of sectors (goods) subjected to the tariff (see e.g. the 
EMF 29 model cross-comparison study summarised in Böhringer et al., 2012a). However, the carbon 
tariff designs investigated so far are not targeted towards the individual firm or shipment, but based on 
the average carbon content of regions or industries. Such tariffs, however, do not give individual 
polluters responsible for the upstream emissions included in embodied carbon metrics a direct 
incentive to reduce the emission intensity of their production. To our knowledge, the only exception in 
the literature is Winchester (2011) who analyses systems designed to incentivise low-carbon 
production processes abroad. The aim of our contribution is to elaborate further on the possibilities, 
limitations, and implications of various carbon tariff systems designed particularly for targeting the 
emission intensities of foreign producers, which we will refer to as (firm-)targeted tariffs. Succeeding 
                                                     
1 E.g., The American Clean Energy and Security Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives (2009) but not by 
the U.S. Senate. 
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to design and implement such systems could improve the economic efficiency and environmental 
effectiveness of BCA.  
 
Compared to Winchester (2011), our contribution is threefold. First, we investigate analytically how 
alternative tariff designs affect firms’ incentives for emission abatement. Second, our numerical 
simulation model is much more disaggrated at the industry- and region-level thereby enhancing the 
policy relevance of our assessment. Third, we cover a broader range of alternative tariff designs which 
offer policy makers more comprehensive insights into the trade-off across different policy options. 
 
Over the last decade, a large number of computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies of BCAs have 
been carried out. The majority of the studies focus on carbon tariffs on imports, only; i.e. they do not 
consider simultaneous export subsidies. They confirm that carbon tariffs reduce the carbon leakage 
problem of unilateral policies. Also, the coalition’s efficiency costs of its carbon policies, as well as 
the competitiveness losses of its emission-intensive industries, decline, while the opposite is true for 
non-coalition countries. See Branger and Quirion (2014), Böhringer et al. (2012a), and Zhang (2012) 
for recent overviews.  The numerical studies have increased our knowledge of the role of various 
factors like coalition size, the coverage of the carbon tariffs, and how embodied emissions are 
calculated.  Many studies include indirect emissions in the the tariff calculations. Only rarely are all 
embodied emissions accounted for (e.g., Böhringer et al., 2012b), but rather often are the emissions 
arising from the use of electricity accounted for (e.g. Mattoo et al. 2009, Winchester 2011, Böhringer 
et al. 2012a).  
 
However, most previous studies look at carbon tariffs calculated based on the industry’s average 
emission intensities in the exporting countries/regions. They depart from the theoretical principle that 
the carbon tariff should adjust according to the the specific embodied emissions in each imported good 
shipped to the border. Only by responding to the actual emission intensity of the good will the system 
be able to incentivise exporters oriented towards the coalition to reduce the carbon intensity of own 
production and also look for inputs with low carbon contents, as they would be remunerated with a 
lower carbon tariff. Our intention is to analyse carbon tariff regimes that go further in this direction. In 
practice, simplifications and generalisations need to be made in order to make the systems realistic and 
manageable. Winchester (2011) studied carbon tariffs that were based on the exporting firms’ actual 
emissions and that would, therefore, adjust to producers’ unit emission changes. In a global model 
with only two regions and one emission-intensive, trade-exposed industry, he found very modest 
effects of allowing for exporter emission responses. We take his ideas further, first, by including far 
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more details in the numerical model and, second, by also allowing for flexible carbon tariffs in 
response to low-carbon choices of electricity input.  
 
Our results are more promising with respect to carbon tariffs than previous findings. Firm-targeted 
tariffs can deliver much stronger leakage reduction and higher global efficiency gains than region-
specific tariffs. In particular, because the exporters are able to reduce their carbon tariffs by adjusting 
to the implicit carbon taxation of the system, both their competitiveness and the overall welfare of 
their economies will be less adversely affected than with region-specific tariff regimes. This beneficial 
distributional impact could facilitate a higher degree of legitimacy and legality. We discuss possible 
practical designs of targeted carbon tariffs in Section 2, then model these systems analytically in 
Section 3 and within a computable framework in Section 4. The numerical results are discussed in 
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Feasibility aspects of targeted carbon tariffs 
According to Hoel (1996), the welfare-maximising carbon tariff on an imported good to a region with 
unilateral carbon pricing should equal the unilateral carbon price times the emissions embodied in the 
good. In practice, proposed and analysed systems depart from the ideal system for legal, practical and 
political reasons. There are particularly two criteria for optimal carbon tariffs that encounter such 
restrictions:  
(i) Embodiment of emissions: The tariff calculations must encompass all carbon emissions in-
volved in the production of the good exported from the non-regulating region to the regulating 
region.  
(ii) The targeting of the tariffs: Carbon tariff rates must be product and firm targeted. Only when 
each shipment gets an individual treatment based on its embodied emissions, will exporters 
face the correct incentives to reduce the embodied emissions per unit of export, and not just 
the total export volume as for conventional tariff rates. 
 
When comes to criteria (i) previous studies have discussed how to practically delimit the emission 
embodiment in the tariff calculations; see, e.g., Böhringer et al. (2012b). Total embodied carbon can 
be decomposed into three components; a) the carbon emissions directly originating from the 
production process of a good, b) indirect emissions involved in generating the electricity that is used in 
the production of the good and c) all other indirect carbon emissions caused when producing all the 
inputs in the production of the good. The tracking of embodied emissions will, obviously, be more 
complex and costly the more comprehensive the coverage.  
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Carbon tariff designs proposed and analysed so far adopt aggregate measures of embodiment.  Most 
designs refer to region-specific averages for each traded good where either the exporting region or the 
importing region is taken as the reference. Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) suggest using the carbon content 
of the best available technology globally. Common to all aggregate approaches is that they do not 
target emissions at the firm (product) level. As a consequence, exporters in atomistic markets perceive 
the tariff rate as given. This will bring about reductions in exports to the unilaterally regulating region 
and more so the more embodied emissions are included. Since the tariff rate is taken as given, 
however, it provides no incentives to reduce embodied emissions per unit of exports. This clearly 
limits the efficiency of the tariff system. 
 
Criteria (ii) on targeting, above, would ensure correct incentives to reduce unit emissions. The strength 
of these incentives for a particular firm would depend on the share of the firm’s sales to the regulating 
region versus non-regulating regions and its flexibility in terms of specialising in either of the markets 
or building separate market-specific production lines.  
 
One important barrier for designing systems in accordance with theory is administration (transaction) 
cost. The more targeted the tariff system, and the more of the indirect emission content to account, the 
more bureaucracy will be involved. Unless a (high) default tariff is accepted by the exporter, the 
information on emissions content would have to be collected by the producers (exporters) or importers 
and validated by some external body. A resembling system exists for food products.2 The 
responsibility of providing, managing and controlling compliance with a certificate system can be 
given to the exporting countries and be administred at the exit border. This would give incentives for 
the administration to rationalise the information and certificate procedures, but there may also be a risk 
of cheating.      
 
To our knowledge, no calculations have been undertaken so far of costs associated with the 
governments’ administration of, and firms’ compliance with, alternative carbon tariff designs. Persson 
(2010) presents scattered estimates of transaction cost components in international trading and carbon 
accounting. Evans (2003) reviews studies of administrative costs of tax systems. He observes that in 
cases where individual companies, not only centralised public bodies, bear a substantial part of the 
                                                     
2 The ISO 22000 standards are established for the purpose of food safety management. A previous system in the EU 
regulated food imports for the purpose of applying variable input levies to protect agricultural production. These two systems 
have in common with an information system for targeted carbon tariffs that inputs of the imported goods have to be mapped 
on a detailed level.  
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paperwork, the administrative costs of tax systems rise substantially. Especially in developing 
countries with inefficient trading environments this would add to already high transaction costs.  
 
However, communications and data technologies develop fast and, recently, novel emissions 
inventories and standards designed for tracking carbon contents have been established that could ease 
the administrative load. One such promising data system is the international standards of carbon 
footprints launched in 2013 – the ISO standard of carbon footprint (ISO 14067: 2013). Until recently 
there has been no common operational definition of the carbon footprint (CPA) of a product. The ISO 
standard of carbon footprint defines CPA as the sum of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
removals in a product system expressed as CO2 equivalents and based on a life-cycle assessment. The 
product system includes inputs of other products, materials and energy flows, starting from the 
deployment of the raw material of natural resources (see also ISO 14044:2006). The life-cycle 
assessment implies that for all products the carbon emissions from both the initial raw material 
depletion, and the final disposal are included, a feature that makes it less relevant for direct use in 
carbon tariff calculations. Offsetting impacts as, e.g., investments in new renewable energy 
technologies, energy efficiency measures, or afforestration/reforestration, are also included.  
 
Another relevant guide to calculating carbon contents is The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (2010), which 
is an updated version of the first Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol. The GHG Protocol provides 
guidance and standards for companies and organisations preparing a GHG emissions inventory. The 
objective is to harmonise GHG accounting and reporting standards internationally. This shall ensure 
that different regimes for emission regulation adopt consistent approaches to GHG accounting. The 
GHG Protocol also includes adjustments for indirect emissions from electricity production, c.f. b) 
above.  
 
Another possibility for documenting the carbon content of products could be to apply procedures 
similar to those practised for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), UNFCCC (2012). In 
contrast to, e.g., ISO certificates, the CDM certificates are based on reports from a Designated 
National Authority (DNA), a body in the country receiving the CDM project, which is granted the 
responsibility to authorise and approve participation in CDM projects.3 In addition, the system requires 
an external validator which has technical expertise in assessing the abatement potential of the project. 
The DNAs are regulated by a CDM accreditation standard (UNFCC 2014), and must report to the 
CDM Executive Board (nominated by the UNFCCC), which takes the final decision on whether the 
                                                     
3 http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/index.html 
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project qualifies as a CDM project. A main issue in the CDM procedure is the assessment of the 
project’s additionality, i.e., the abatement it adds compared to a baseline in the absence of the CDM 
project. This task is not relevant when settling carbon tariff rates. Another difference is that only direct 
emissions are measured in CDM projects, which limits the usefulness of the CDM standards. Other 
drawbacks are that the standards appear less transparent than the ISO standards and the procedures are 
labour-consuming as both the DNA, the external validator and the CDM Executive Board have to 
approve the assessments. 
 
From the discussion above, it seems that the new ISO certification procedure would be the most 
accurate and easiest to implement. In this context, experiences from existing and previous border 
procedures for food products could be highly relevant for an ISO carbon footprint system.   
 
Along with the practical obstacles of implementing and operating firm-targeted carbon tariffs come 
several legal and political hindrances. Böhringer et al. (2012b) discuss these issues in more detail. The 
main legal challenge is to comply with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) law. Discrimination of 
equal goods based on their production methods is not legal. Though it may be legal to take action 
based on environmental considerations, the rules are strict. Allowing exporters to affect their tariff rate 
by adjusting their carbon input could be more acceptable than rigid average tariff rates. On the other 
hand, comprehensive documentation requirements can be regarded as non-tariff trade barriers.  
 
The international political implications of carbon tariffs are also a critical issue. Trade disputes can 
deteriorate the political climate for international cooperation and hurt further climate negotiations. The 
danger of retaliation from large countries must also be taken into account. This became obvious in the 
dispute on EU’s attempt to include international flights into the EU ETS, as alluded above. Previous 
studies of carbon tariff systems show that the distributional effects are in disfavour of the countries 
subjected to them (Branger and Quirron, 2014). Distributional aspects could strengthen the case for 
firm-targeted tariffs, as these allow exporting firms to reduce their tariff costs and competitiveness 
losses. 
 
Based on the discussion above, we cannot unambiguously conclude that a targeted system which treats 
firms individually increases the political, legal and practical barriers. Some aspects of firm-targeted 
systems can actually be politically and legally superior to less targeted systems because they have 
distributional advantages and can be regarded as more fair. Furthermore, practical barriers have 
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diminished during recent years as complex electronic data bases are developed and border registration 
procedures established.  
3. Theoretical analysis 
In this section we show analytically how different tariff designs may affect firms’ incentives for 
emission abatement. We consider a region with a carbon price t, which imposes carbon tariffs τj per 
unit of imports of goods j from various non-regulating regions.  
3.1 Region-specific tariffs on direct emissions  
A firm i producing good j in the non-regulating region and exporting to the regulating region has the 
following profit function: 
 
(1) y xij j ij j ij j ijp y p x y      s.t.  ( )ij ij ij ijy f x ,e  
 
y
jp  is the product price of good j in the market of the regulating region, yij is exported quantity, eij 
denotes emissions and xjp  is the price of the input, xij (to simplify notation and without loss of 
generality for tariffs on direct emissions, only, we consider only one input). fij is the production 
function, which is assumed to be concave and increasing in both xij and eij  
( / 0ij ijf x   , 2 2/ ( ) 0ij ijf x   , / 0ij ijf e   , 2 2/ ( ) 0ij ijf e   ). 
 
The level of the tariff τj is generally given by the product of the carbon price t and some emission 
intensity εj for good j: j jt  . To start with, we assume that the tariff only targets direct emissions. 
The conventional assumption in the literature is that εj facing the firm i is determined by the average 
emission intensity jˆ of producing good j in the region in which the firm operates. Hence, assuming 
that each firm is too small to have a notable influence on jˆ , the tariff τj is considered exogenous for 
the individual firm. This is how carbon tariffs are modelled in almost all numerical studies so far (cf. 
the introduction).4  In this case, the first-order conditions for the exporting firm i in the non-regulating 
region are: 
                                                     
4 Alternatively, the tariffs can be based on average emission intensities over exporting countries. They can also be based on 
emission intensities in the regulating countries (see Böhringer et al., 2012b for an analysis of different tariff designs). Further, 
jˆ  can be determined either exogenously based on base-year emission intensities, or endogenously based on emission 
intensities in the new equilibrium. The tariff payments are usually allocated to the import country, but they could 
alternatively be allocated to the export country. 
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(2)  0/  ijjyjijij py   
(3)    0ij ij ij ij ij/ e f / e        
μij denotes the shadow price on the production constraint ( )ij ij ij ijy f x ,e , which also can be 
interpreted as the marginal costs of production.  Equation (2) states that the firm will expand 
production until the price minus the (exogenous) tariff equal the marginal costs of production. 
Equation (3) says that the firm will not make any efforts to reduce its emissions intensity, as it does 
not pay off in terms of lower tariff payments.  
3.2 Firm-targeted tariffs on direct emissions  
Alternatively, the carbon tariff can be firm-targeted.5   
(4)  ijy x y xij j ij j ij ij j ij j ij ij
ij
e
p y p x t y p y p x te
y
         s.t.  ( )ij ij ij ijy f x ,e  
 
The first-order conditions for the exporting firm are: 
(5) 0yij ij j ij/ y p       
 
(6)   0ij ij ij ij ij/ e t f / e          
 
We see that the firm now will expand production (export) until price equals marginal production costs. 
Further, the firm will increase emissions until the marginal benefits of higher emissions,  yj ij ijp f / e  , 
equal the price of emissions t. In other words, the firm will reduce emissions until marginal abatement 
costs equal the carbon price. Notice that a firm inside the regulating region will have the same first-
order conditions, given either a carbon tax or a quota price equal to t. 
 
By comparing the first-order conditions in equations (2)-(3) with equations (5)-(6) we notice that the 
first-order effect of changing from a region-specific tariff to a firm-targeted carbon tariff is to lower 
emissions and increase production (i.e., exports to the regulating region).  
                                                     
5 In reality, this could e.g. be implemented as an option for exporting firms, where the default tariff is the country-specific 
tariff. 
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3.3 Region-specific tariffs on direct and indirect emissions 
So far we have only considered emissions at the production plant, and disregarded indirect emissions 
from generating electricity or other inputs that are used in producing good j. For various goods, 
electricity is an important input into production, accounting for a significant share of the total carbon 
footprint of producing these goods. To increase the outreach and effectiveness proposals of carbon 
tariffs often include indirect emissions from electricity production when calculating the tariff. Again, 
the conventional assumption in the literature is that the tariff gets an additional term which is 
determined based on average emission intensities in the electricity sector and the average use of 
electricity per unit production of good j. In this case equations (1)-(3) are unchanged, except that the 
value of the tariff has increased. 
3.4 Firm-targeted tariffs on direct and region-specific on indirect emissions  
We now assume that firm-targeted tariffs are based on direct emissions (as in Equation (4)) and 
indirect emissions from own use of electricity (denoted Eijx ). Furthermore, we consider the case where 
the average emission intensity in the electricity sector Eˆ  is used to calculate the second part of the 
tariff. Hence, the tariff for firm i is equal to )ˆ)/(( Eij
E
ijij yxt   . The profit function of the firm then 
becomes: 
(7)   Eij ijy x E E y x E E Eij j ij j ij j ij E ij j ij j ij j ij ij ij E
ij ij
e x
ˆ ˆp y p x p x t y p y p x p x t e x
y y
               
  
 s.t.  ( )Eij ij ij ij ijy f x ,x ,e  
 
Without the tariff the optimal use of electricity is given by the standard first-order condition
  0E E Eij ij j ij ij ij/ x p f / x         , similar to equation (6) for emissions. With the tariff, however, 
the first-order condition for electricity use becomes (the first-order conditions given in equations (5)-
(6) carry over with this tariff): 
 
(8)   0E E Eij ij j E ij ij ijˆ/ x p t f / x            
 
We notice that the tariff enhances incentives for firms to cut back on electricity use, as the shadow 
price of electricity is equal to the electricity price plus the extra tariff payments per unit of electricity 
use.  
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3.5 Firm-targeted tariffs on direct and indirect emissions 
Finally, we consider the case where the firm can reduce its tariff payments further if it can demonstrate 
that its electricity use comes from electricity plants with lower than average emission intensities.6 The 
tariff then becomes ))/(( iEij
E
ijij yxt   , where εiE denotes the emission intensity of the electricity 
bought by firm i. The firm now has an incentive to pay electricity generators an additional amount if 
they can deliver cleaner than average electricity. A reduction in the emission intensity εiE will lower 
the tariff payment by t for every unit of electricity used. Hence, the firm will be willing to pay up to 
E
ijt x  for every unit reduction in εiE. To investigate the outcome of such a tariff, we first consider the 
case where the firm owns the electricity plant delivering electricity to the firm (in other words: the 
firm does own generation). In this case, the firm internalizes all costs and benefits from electricity 
generation. Its profit function becomes: 
 
(9)  
     
 
y x E E E E E E E x E
ij j ij j ij j ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij j ij E iE
y x E E E E E x E
j ij j ij j ij ij ij j ij E iE
p y p x p x t e / y x / y e / x y p x p x
p y p x p x t e e p x p x
       
      
  
  s.t.  ( )
E
ij ij ij ij ijy f x ,x ,e and ( )
E
ij iE iE iEx f x ,e  
 
where fiE is the production function for electricity generation, and xiE denotes input into this 
production. Note that we keep E Ej ijp x  and E Ej ijp x  in the expression to explicitly state the (internal) 
payment for electricity.  
The first-order conditions are given by Equations (5), (6) and: 
 
(10)   / 0E E Eij ij ij ij ij ij/ x f x           
 
(11)   / 0E E Eij ij ij iE ij/ e t f e           
 
where Eij  denotes the shadow price on the electricity production constraint ( )Eij iE iE iEx f x ,e , which 
can be interpreted as the marginal costs of generating electricity. Equation (10) simply states that the 
marginal costs of generating electricity should equal the marginal benefits through its impact on firm 
output. Equation (11) states that the marginal costs of reducing emissions in electricity generation 
                                                     
6 Alternatively, since electricity usually comes from the grid and not from one or a few specific plants, the firm could 
possibly buy green certificates or in other ways pay for greener than average electricity production, see footnote 9.  
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should equal the carbon price t. Hence, the electricity generation used to supply the firms exporting to 
the regulating region faces the same incentives as electricity producers inside the regulating region.  
Finally, we drop the assumption that the firm does own generation. In this case electricity generation is 
“outsourced”, and the firm makes an agreement with an electricity producer. A likely outcome is that 
the two firms will come to an agreement that optimizes their joint profit. If so, the first order 
conditions above still hold. 
4. Numerical analysis 
4.1 Scenarios 
Our numerical analysis is designed to compare alternate carbon tariff designs that combine variations 
of the two dimensions presented in Section 2: (i) the embodiment of emissions and (ii) the degree of 
targeting. When it comes to (i) we look at systems including direct emissions (Dir) and both direct and 
indirect emissions from electricity (Indir). In terms of (ii) we study region-specific (Reg) and firm-
targeted (Firm) tariffs.  
 
We consider six different carbon policy scenarios, which we compare against the business-as-usual 
(BaU) without carbon policy regulation. In the benchmark scenario (Bench) we introduce uniform 
carbon pricing via a domestic cap-and-trade regime in the regulating region. The five remaining 
scenarios combine carbon pricing with tariffs based on embodied carbon. The combinations are in line 
with the five systems analysed in our theoretical exposition in Section 3; see Table 1. Beyond the four 
scenarios representing all combinations of the dimensions (i) and (ii), they include the system studied 
by Winchester (2011) that combines firm-targeting of direct emissions with embodiment of indirect 
emissions from electricity in a region-specific manner (FirmDirRegIndir).  
 
We impose the same cap on global emissions across all policy scenarios at the level that emerges from 
the Bench scenario.7 Thus, welfare outcomes can be compared across scenarios irrespective of the 
evaluation of emissons. In our core simulations we take Europe (EU28 plus EFTA) as the unilaterally 
abating region. Carbon tariff systems apply to emission-intensive and trade-exposed goods (industries) 
imported to Europe from all other regions, see Table 2 for details. 
 
 
                                                     
7 Technically, we adjust the emission cap of the regulating region endogenously such that the carbon price in the regulating 
region ensures the global emissions to be ceiled at the emission level of the Bench scenario. 
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Table 1: Overview of scenarios  
Scenario Description  Theoretical analysis  
Bench Uniform carbon price in EUR  
RegDir Uniform carbon price + tariffs based on a region’s average direct 
emissions in the industry  
See section 3.1 
FirmDir Uniform carbon price + tariffs based on firm-specific direct 
emissions  
See section 3.2 
RegIndir Uniform carbon price + tariffs based on a region’s average direct 
emissions per industry and indirect emissions from electricity  
See section 3.3 
FirmDirRegIndir Uniform carbon price + tariffs based on firm-specific direct 
emissions and region-specific indirect emissions from electricity  
See section 3.4 
FirmIndir Uniform carbon price + tariffs based on firm-specific direct 
emissions and indirect emissions from electricity  
See section 3.5 
4.2 The computable general equilibrium model 
For our quantitative economic impact analysis of targeted border carbon tariffs  we use a multi-region, 
multi-sector CGE model of global trade and energy established for the analysis of GHG emission 
control strategies (see, e.g., Böhringer et al., 2010, for a detailed algebraic description). The CGE 
approach makes it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency as well as distributional impacts 
of the carbon policy reforms. 
 
Our model features a representative household in each region that receives income from three primary 
factors: labour, capital and fossil fuel resources. Labour and capital are intersectorally mobile within a 
region but immobile between regions. Fossil fuel resources are specific to fossil fuel production 
sectors in each region. Production of commodities other than primary fossil fuels is captured by three-
level constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions describing the price-dependent use of 
capital, labour, energy and materials (KLEM). At the top level, a CES composite of intermediate 
material demands trades off with an aggregate of energy, capital and labour. At the second level, a 
CES function describes the substitution possibilities between intermediate demand for the energy 
aggregate and a value-added composite of labour and capital. At the third level, capital and labor 
substitution possibilities within the value-added composite are captured by a CES function whereas 
different energy inputs (coal, gas, oil, and electricity) enter the energy composite subject. In the 
production of fossil fuels, all inputs, except for the sector-specific fossil fuel resource, are aggregated 
in fixed proportions. This aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant 
elasticity of substitution. 
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Final consumption demand in each region is determined by the representative agent who maximizes 
welfare subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment (i.e., a given demand for savings) and 
exogenous government provision of public goods and services. Total income of the representative 
agent consists of net factor income and tax revenues net of subsidies. Consumption demand of the 
representative agent is given as a CES composite that combines consumption of composite energy and 
an aggregate of other (non-energy) consumption goods. Substitution patterns within the energy bundle 
as well as within the non-energy composite are reflected by means of CES functions.  
 
Bilateral trade is specified following the Armington’s differentiated goods approach, where domestic 
and foreign goods are distinguished by origin (Armington, 1969). All goods used on the domestic 
market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a CES composite that combines the 
domestically produced good and the imported good from other regions. A balance of payment 
constraint incorporates the base-year trade deficit or surplus for each region.  
 
CO2 emissions are linked in fixed proportions to the use of fossil fuels, with CO2 coefficients 
differentiated by the specific carbon content of fuels. Restrictions to the use of CO2 emissions in 
production and consumption are implemented through a CO2 tax or (in the sensitivity analysis) as an 
(equivalent) exogenous emission constraint. CO2 emission abatement takes place by fuel switching 
(interfuel substitution) or energy savings (either by fuel-non-fuel substitution or by a scale reduction of 
production and final consumption activities). 
4.3 Implementation of firm-targeted tariffs 
We differentiate trade flows at the bilateral level. Each industry (sector) in each region disposes of 
production lines distinguished by destination.8 When firm-targeted tariffs are introduced on bilateral 
trade flows, the export production lines subjected to tariffs will have incentives to change the input 
mix as shown in the theory part, Section 3.  
 
We consider tariffs based on both direct emissions and indirect emissions from electricity use. When 
the latter part of the tariff is based on average emission intensities in the region, electricity will 
become more expensive for exporters inducing them to use less electricity than before. When the tariff 
is based on the individual firm’s indirect emissions, i.e., emissions from the electricity used by the 
                                                     
8 All production lines within a sector share the same CES production technology (see section 4.2). Thus, BaU production 
across the different lines split proportionally to BaU supply shares. 
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individual firm, the firm has a direct incentive to buy less emission-intensive electricity. To represent 
this mechanism, we distinguish electricy supply to the different production lines  
 
Obviously, with a national electricity grid, it is not possible to know where exactly the electricity 
comes from (unless it is produced in the firm through own generation). Our setting can be interpreted 
as if a market will emerge for some labelling or certificate system, providing firms with credible 
documentation on the carbon content of their electricity input. This system could resemble systems 
already exisiting in countries with regulations, including several US states, the UK and the common 
Swedish-Norwegian green certificate market.9 
 
It should be noted that our implementation of tariffs in the model still keeps the assumption that firms 
within each industry and region have homogenous technologies. This simplifying assumption 
significantly reduces the necessary data input of the already comprehensive and detailed model. 
However, this comes at some loss in real-world heterogeneity. Even before introducing carbon tariffs 
emission intensities will likely vary across firms within the same sector. Carbon tariffs could, thus, 
lead to sorting where the least emission-intensive firms export to the regulating region, while the most 
emission-intensive firms supply to the other regions. Although the least emission-intensive firms may 
still find it profitable to reduce emissions further when tariffs are firm-targeted rather than region-
specific, our model setting will probably overestimate the difference. This is also the case when we 
consider emissions from electricity generation. Instead of reducing emission intensities in some plants, 
the reality could be that the exporters switch to electricity plants with relatively low emissions. Thus, 
the options could be more discrete than our modelling implicitly assumes and, again, the firm-
targeting will have smaller impacts compared to a setting where agents are representative. 
4.4 Data 
Our CGE analysis is based on the most recent version of the Global Trade, Assistance and Production 
(GTAP) database which includes detailed national accounts on production and consumption (input–
output tables) together with bilateral trade flows and CO2 emissions for the year 2007 (version 8 of 
GTAP – see Narayanan et al., 2012). GTAP can be flexibly aggregated towards a composite dataset 
that accounts for the specific requirements of the policy issue under investigation. As to sectoral 
disaggregation our composite dataset includes all major primary and secondary energy carriers: coal, 
crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products and electricity. This disaggregation is essential in order to 
                                                     
9 See http://www.cleanpowermarkets.com/green_certificates.php for states in the US, http://www.greenenergyscheme.org/ 
for the UK, and http://www.nve.no/en/Electricity-market/Electricity-certificates/ for Norway-Sweden. 
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distinguish energy goods by CO2 intensity and the degree of substitutability. In addition, we separate 
the main emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) sectors: chemical products, non-metallic 
minerals, iron and steel products, and non-ferrous metals, as they will be potentially most affected by 
emission control policies and therefore are the prime candidates for compensatory measures such as 
carbon tariffs.10 The remaining industries covered in our dataset include three transport sectors, as well 
as a composite sector of all remaining manufacturers and services. Regarding regional coverage, we 
explicitly include major industrialised and developing countries to capture international market 
responses to unilateral emission regulation. Table 1 summarises the sectors (commodities) and regions 
present in our actual impact analysis of alternative carbon tariff schemes. 
 
Table 2: Model sectors and regions 
Sectors and commodities Countries and regions 
Energy Europe – EU-28 plus EFTA (EUR) 
Coal (COA) United States of America (USA) 
Crude oil (CRU) Russia (RUS) 
Natural gas (GAS) Remaining Annex 1** (RA1) 
Refined oil products* (OIL) Energy exporting countries (EEX) 
Electricity (ELE)  China (CHN) 
 India (IND) 
Emission-intensive & trade-exposed sectors* Other middle income countries (MIC) 
Chemical products (CRP) Other low income countries (LIC) 
Non-metallic minerals (NMM)  
Iron and steel industry (I_S)  
Non-ferrous metals (NFM)  
  
Other sectors  
Air transport (ATP)  
Water transport (WTP)  
Other transport (OTP)  
All other manufactures and services (AOG)  
* Included in the composite Emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries (EITE) when implementing tariffs on EITE goods. 
**Includes Canada, Japan, Belarus, Ukraine, Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey.    
 
For model parameterisation, we follow the standard calibration procedure in CGE analysis: the base-
year input-output data determine the free parameters of the functional forms — cost and expenditure 
functions — such that the economic flows represented in the data are consistent with the optimising 
behaviour of the model agents. The responses of agents to price changes are determined by a set of 
exogenous elasticities taken from the pertinent econometric literature. Elasticities in international trade 
(Armington elasticities) indicate the substitutability between varieties of each good between three 
regions, which is a key characteristic in the analysis. These Armington elasticities are taken from the 
GTAP database which also provides estimates for substitution elasticites among factor inputs to 
                                                     
10 Note that Refined oil products also classify as an EITE good when we implement tariffs on EITE goods. 
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production. The elasticities of substitution in fossil fuel sectors are calibrated to match exogenous 
estimates of fossil fuel supply elasticities (Graham et al., 1999; Krichene, 2002). 
4.5 Simulation results 
Our core simulations refer to unilateral emission regulation of Europe. The Bench scenario involves a 
20% reduction in domestic CO2 emissions for Europe as compared to its BaU emission levels. The 
remaining five climate policy scenarios achieve the same global emission reduction as Bench for 
alternative assumptions on the design of supplemental carbon tariffs that are applied to EITE goods. If 
not stated otherwise, the effects of policy regulation are reported as percentage change from the BaU 
situation. In our exposition below, we use the acronym EUR to refer to Europe and the acronym non-
EUR to denote all other regions. 
Carbon leakage 
Figure 1 shows the carbon leakage rates in the policy scenarios, i.e. the increase in emissions in the 
non-EUR regions divided by the emissions reduction in EUR resulting from its policy. In Bench, the 
scenario with no carbon tariffs, the leakage rate is 18.0%. In line with previous studies (see e.g. 
Fischer and Fox, 2012, and the EMF study summarised by Böhringer et al., 2012a), we see that tariffs 
based on average regional embodied emissions reduce the leakage rates, and particularly so if they 
also take into account indirect emissions from electricity production. The resulting leakage rates in the 
RegDir and RegIndir scenarios are 16.4% and 14.5%, respectively. 
 
Our analysis of firm-targeted tariffs provides new insight compared to the existing literature. As 
Figure 1 shows, carbon leakage declines further as the exporting firms face incentives to abate. 
Moving from RegDir to FirmDir, when the tariffs are based on direct embodied emissions, only, 
yields a modest reduction in the leakage rate, from 16.4% to 14.7%. The drop is considerably larger 
when the tariffs are based on indirect emissions from electricity use, too; leakage drops from 14.5% 
under RegIndir to 8.3% under FirmIndir. As mentioned above, Winchester (2011) considers a hybrid 
variant where the embodied emissions that are accounted for by the tariff consist of firm-specific 
direct emissions and region-specific indirect emissions from electricity. For comparison, we also 
include this scenario in our analysis (FirmDirRegIndir). It yields a carbon leakage rate of 11.6%, i.e., a 
reduction of one third from the benchmark level (Bench), quite similar to the results reported by 
Winchester (2011).  
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Figure 1: Leakage rates (in %) 
 
EITE exports, emissions and tariff payments 
Figure 2 shows how EITE export from non-EUR regions to EUR are affected in the five policy 
scenarios compared to BaU. It also shows the impact on emissions from this export activity. In the 
Bench scenario, we notice that export increases, which is as expected. We also see that emissions 
increase slightly more than output – increased emission intensities are due to lower world market 
prices of fossil fuels caused by reduced consumption of these fuels in EUR.  
 
When we consider the tariff scenarios, we see that EITE export from the non-EUR regions to EUR is 
reduced for all tariff scenarios and that the related emissions decrease even more than the export 
levels, i.e.,  emission intensities decline. At first glance this may seem counter-intuitive in the cases 
with region-specific tariffs: First, as we showed in the analytical part, region-specific tariffs do not 
give firms incentives to reduce emissions per output. Second, fossil fuel prices are still reduced in 
these tariff scenarios, suggesting substitution towards, not away from, these fuels. The explanation is 
that the composition of EITE export changes towards less emission-intensive EITE goods. In 
particular, export from regions with high emissions intensities is partly replaced by export from 
regions with lower emissions per output, as the tariffs are based on the average emissions intensities in 
the particular region.  
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Figure 2 highlights two important effects of moving from RegDir to FirmDir. First of all, emissions 
related to the EITE export from the non-EUR regions to EUR are drastically reduced. This reduction is 
much larger than the corresponding output reduction, reflecting a significant decline in average 
emission intensities. This suggests that firms’ emission intensities have fallen as a response to the 
incentives that firm-targeted tariffs create for reducing emission intensities, thereby avoiding parts of 
the tariff burdens. In addition, compositional changes of the exports take place. However, by studying 
the emission intensities region by region and sector by sector, we find that the former explanation is, 
indeed, the dominant. The second observed effect when moving from RegDir to FirmDir in Figure 2 is 
that the tariffs in FirmDir lead to smaller cutbacks in export from the non-EUR regions to EUR than 
do RegDir tariffs. This is consistent with our analytical discussion and the observation of emission 
intensities above: As long as firms find it profitable to reduce their emission intensity, their tariffs are 
reduced and, hence, it becomes more profitable to export to EUR.  
 
Figure 2: EITE exports from non-EUR regions to EUR and associated emissions (% change 
from BaU) 
 
 
When comparing the RegDir and FirmDir scenarios with the corresponding scenarios where indirect 
emissions from electricity are accounted for (RegIndir and FirmIndir) we observe, as expected, that 
the EITE export to EUR declines as the tariffs are increased and include more embodied carbon (see 
Figure 2). The hybrid case FirmDirRegIndir also has smaller export than the two Dir-scenarios, and 
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also lower (direct) emissions associated with this production. However, we notice that emissions do 
not decline as much as exports when moving from FirmDir to FirmIndir, i.e., average emission 
intensities at the EITE plants increase. This is partly due a lower CO2 price in EUR (see Figure 4). 
Lower carbon leakage and, thus, less CO2 cuts necessary in EUR in order to keep global emissions 
unchanged, explain the drop in the CO2 price. This is carried over to the carbon tariff, which thus gives 
a weaker incentive to reduce emissions at the EITE firm. An additional explanation for the increased 
emission intensity is that when the tariff also includes indirect emissions from electricity, the EITE 
firms have incentives to switch away from the use of electricity towards other inputs such as fossil 
fuels (in the FirmIndir and FirmDirRegIndir scenarios). The economy-wide emission responses of 
including indirect emissions are, however, far larger in the Firm than in the Reg cases, because of the 
additional abatement incentives in the electricity sector of the former.  
 
The carbon tariff payments of different non-EUR regions are illustrated in Figure 3. We see that for all 
regions, the tariff payments decrease when moving from RegDir to FirmDir. This comes in spite of 
larger exports from all the non-EUR regions in FirmDir and reflects a drop in the tariff rates. The 
main explanation is that the embodied emissions in the exports fall when the firms have the incentive 
to reduce their emission intensities.  
 
Figure 3: Carbon tariff payments by non-EUR regions (billion USD2007)  
 
Note: See Table 2 for regional acronyms 
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The reduction in tariff payments of the non-EUR regions is even stronger when moving from RegIndir 
to FirmIndir. There are two mechanisms driving this result. First, emissions from the electricity 
generating plants that supply the EITE producers exporting to EUR, decline by 18%. This is due to a 
combination of lower emission intensity among these plants, and the reduction in electricity use for the 
EITE producers. These behavioural changes illustrate the potential benefits of additionally targeting 
indirect emissions from electricity generation when firm-specific tariffs are used. The second 
explanation is that the necessary CO2 price to reach the global emission reduction target is reduced by 
12% in the FirmIndir case compared to RegIndir; see Figure 4. As explained above, reduced carbon 
leakage allows for a drop in the domestic EUR emission price. 
 
Figure 4: CO2 price (USD2007 per ton CO2) 
 
 
The hybrid regime FirmDirRegIndir provides incentives in the EITE industries to use less electricity 
than in the FirmDir case. However, as for RegIndir, the emission intensities of power generators do 
not respond. This case, thus, reduces tariff payments for all non-EUR regions compared to RegIndir, 
but not as much as is seen for the FirmIndir case.  
EITE output 
The introduction of carbon pricing in EUR (the Bench scenario) leads to lower output of EITE goods; 
see Figure 5. EITE goods are emission-intensive such that carbon pricing induces a non-negligible 
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increase in production costs. Even in a closed market we would expect reduced EITE output as a 
consequence of structural change towards a lower carbon economy. In an open economy, unilateral 
emissions pricing will decrease international competitiveness of domestic EITE production with a 
relocation of EITE production to non-EUR regions. Figure 5 reveals differences across the EITE 
sectors, which are due to differences in emission intensities and trade exposure, the latter being 
reflected in initial trade shares and Armington elasticities.  
 
Figure 5: EITE production in EUR (% change from BaU) 
 
Note: See Table 2 for sectoral acronyms 
 
Supplementing the carbon pricing with carbon tariffs attenuates the EITE output losses in EUR. We 
find this irrespective of the tariff scenario and across all EITE sectors (cf. Figure 5). Comparing 
RegDir with FirmDir reveals mixed results across industries. As EITE exports from the non-EUR 
regions to EUR slightly increase when moving from RegDir to FirmDir (Figure 2), one might expect 
the EUR output to move in the opposite direction, as a competitiveness effect. However, we see this 
only for two of the EITE industries: Iron & steel and Non-metal minerals. For the remainder we find 
that FirmDir results in a smaller fall from BaU in the EUR outputs than RegDir. For Refined oil the 
output increase is substantial and dominates the overall output result for the EITE aggregate. The 
explanation for these mixed results on output is that there are two driving forces that go in different 
directions: One is the increased competition from imports, which is due to lower tariffs for non-EUR 
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firms under FirmDir. The other is lower production costs due to lower CO2 and energy prices in 
FirmDir than in RegDir (see e.g. Figure 4), which tends to stimulate domestic output. In the same 
vein, we can explain the sector-specific output effects of moving from regeion-specific to firm-
targeted tariffs when indirect emissions from electricity are accounted for (from RegIndir to 
FirmIndir). In this case, the competition effect dominates the effects of lower production costs for all 
EITE industries, except Refined oil and, thus, output is lower. Aggregate EITE output also drops.  
Welfare effects 
Previous studies have shown that carbon tariffs are likely to reduce the welfare costs of climate 
policies, both for the unilaterally abating region and for the world as a whole, while non-abating 
regions suffer from the imposition of tariffs (Böhringer et al., 2012a; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Mattoo et 
al., 2009).  
 
Figure 6 confirms these findings. Welfare effects are stated in Hicksian equivalent variation in income. 
Carbon tariffs moderate the welfare costs of unilateral action for EUR, while the costs for non-EUR 
rise. For EUR, moving to more targeted systems either by including indirect emissions and/or by 
giving non-EUR firms incentives to reduce emissions is beneficial. The most targeted system 
(FirmIndir) reduces the welfare costs of EUR by as much as 32% compared to Bench. The gain 
reflects both lower competition from non-EUR exporters (see Figure 2 and 5), and lower carbon 
leakage which allows for higher emissions in EUR (see Figure 2 and 4). 
 
A main observation from Figure 6 is that trade-offs between the welfare effects for EUR and non-EUR 
are not severe. In particular, we notice that firm-targeted tariffs are better than region-specific tariffs 
for both EUR and non-EUR. This is true whether the tariffs are based on direct emissions, only, or 
both direct and indirect. Furthermore, including indirect emissions in firm-targeted tariffs (FirmIndir 
vs. FirmDir) benefits EUR without increasing the costs for non-EUR, because firm-targeted tariffs 
ensure non-EUR firms the opportunity to reduce their tariff rates by reducing emission intensities both 
in own production and their electricity input. This possibility is absent when tariffs on similar goods 
are common for all firms in a non-EUR region. Then, including indirect embodied emissions in the 
basis for the tariff rates (RegIndir vs. RegDir) will unavoidably increase the rates, and the costs for the 
non-EUR regions increase by 12%. Interestingly, the most targeted system, where firms exporting to 
the coalition are tariffed according to their direct and indirect emissions (FirmIndir) is slightly less 
costly for the non-EUR regions than the least targeted (RegDir). Moreover, welfare costs for EUR are 
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reduced by 21%. FirmIndir, the cheapest carbon policy regime for the world as an entity is, thus, not 
riddled by severe distributional dilemmas.  
 
All these tariff regimes reduce global welfare costs of EUR’s carbon policies compared to Bench; the 
most effective, FirmIndir, by as much as 18%. This is a larger benefit of carbon tariffs than in the 
previous studies listed above.The reason is that this carbon tariff regime is based on firm-specific 
information and account for indirect emissions. As shown in the theoretical section, such carbon tariffs 
are more targeted than previously studied designs, because they motivate unit emission reductions in 
the firms (both directly and indirectly) involved in exporting to EUR. While introducing region-
specific tariffs based on the direct emissions (RegDir) reduces global welfare loss by merely 4%, 
going from RegDir to FirmDir implies an additional 3 percentage points reduction in welfare costs 
(see Figure 6). Further, also including indirect emissions in FirmIndir saves another 11 percentage 
points of the welfare costs – in total 18% – compared to Bench.  
 
Figure 6. Regional welfare effects (% change in Hicksian equivalent variation) 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
To investigate the robustness of our insights we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to two key 
drivers of economic impacts: the regional coverage of unilateral abatement on the one hand, and the 
trade responsiveness, captured by the Armington elasticities of substitution between domestic and 
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foreign products. We focus, hereby, on the most targeted tariff alternative with firm-targeted tariffs 
including emissions from the electricity input – FirmIndir. Figure 7 shows that as we expand unilateral 
emission regulation from EUR to include also the United States (EUR+USA) and both the USA and 
China (EUR+USA+CHN) there are gradually less global benefits. This is as expected – when the 
coalition becomes larger, the leakage rate drops substantially, i.e., by more than 50% with the 
EUR+USA coalition, and by additional 50% when China is included (both under Bench and 
FirmIndir). The welfare loss of carbon policies is largest with the EUR+US coalition. This is intuitive 
when compared to the EUR coalition, as global emissions are further reduced when more countries 
join the coalition.11 When China also joins the coalition, Europe and the US get access to cheaper 
abatement options, and we see that this benefit actually dominates the cost effects of larger emission 
reductions.  
 
Figure 7: Global welfare changes with different coalitions and Armingtion elasticites (% change 
in Hicksian equivalent variation). 
 
 
Compared to the effects of regional expansion the benefits from targeted tariffs are less sensitive to the 
choice of Armington elasticities (the last column in Figure 7 examines the case of unilateral emission 
regulation in EUR).The welfare benefits of firm-targeted tariffs increase with higher Armington 
elasticities (which are doubled compared to the central case settings). This is also as expected – the 
                                                     
11 Global emission reductions are 2.6% with the EUR coalition, 6.8% with the EU+US and 10.9% with EU+US+China. 
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larger the trade sensitivity the bigger is the leakage rates and, thus, the higher are the benefits of 
targeted carbon tariffs. 
5. Conclusions 
The climate effect of unilateral carbon pricing is undermined due to carbon leakage. To mitigate 
leakage and increase global cost-effectiveness of unilateral abatement action, the literature suggests 
supplementing unilateral carbon pricing with carbon tariffs designed so as to tax all the carbon 
emissions directly and indirectly embodied in net imports equally to domestic emissions. In this paper 
we discuss the possibilities, limitations, and implications of alternative carbon tariff systems designed 
to capture the carbon footprint of producers in non-regulating countries. In particular, we propose 
practical carbon tariff systems designed to mimic the theoretical principle that the carbon tariff should 
adjust according to the specific embodied emissions in each imported good. We first present a 
theoretical analysis on the economic incentives for emission abatement of producers in unregulated 
countries that are subjected to different designs of carbon tariffs. We then operationalise these carbon 
tariff systems in a multi-sector, multi-region CGE model of the global economy to quantify the 
different impacts based on empirical data and practical systems.  
 
Theoretical analysis shows that introducing carbon tariffs increases the efficiency of a region’s carbon 
policy more the more targeted the carbon tariffs are and the more emissions they embody. Our 
numerical analysis indicates that implementable firm-targeted systems have substantial welfare 
advantages compared to previously studied systems. Particularly promising are systems that also target 
embodied indirect emissions from electricity supply in the non-regulating regions. The reductions in 
carbon leakage and the gains in global welfare that we find are significantly larger than suggested by 
previous studies.  
 
Furthermore, the exporters’ competitiveness and the overall welfare of their economies will be less 
randomly and less adversely affected. This beneficial distributional impact of a more targeted 
approach could facilitate a higher degree of legitimacy and legality of carbon tariffs as a supplemental 
instrument in unilateral climate policy. 
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